Conditional Judgment is Proper and Within Bounds of Substantial Justice
In Jones v. United Equitable Group Ltd., the appeal arises from an insurance coverage dispute surrounding an automobile collision that occurred between Tinisha Jones (“Jones”) and Devin Knockum (“Knockum”) on April 17, 2008. Jones subsequently filed a negligence suit against Knockum on July 31, 2008, to recover for their personal injuries. When Knockum failed to submit a timely answer, the trial court held her in default, which was later vacated when United Equitable Group, Ltd., d/b/a United Equitable Insurance Company (“UEIC”) provided counsel to defend. The case was assigned to mandatory arbitration on December 10, 2009, with one of the contested issues being liability for the collision. Approximately one month later, Knockum filed for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge from her debts. After stipulating that they would seek damages against Knockum only to the extent of her UEIC policy, Jones proceeded with the case. On September 23, 2011, the trial court reset the case for arbitration. However, Knockum again failed to appear, and the arbitrator ultimately entered a judgment against Knockum in the amount of $25.097.09. Knockum filed a motion to reject the arbitration award, which the trial court struck before entering judgment on the arbitration award in favor of plaintiffs on December 14, 2011. On February 12, 2012, Jones initiated a non-wage garnishment proceeding against UEIC. On March 17, 2012, after UEIC failed to file a timely appearance or answer by the return date, the trial court entered a conditional judgment against UEIC.
The court addressed the question of whether garnishment action denied substantial justice. UEIC argues that the May 2, 2012, hearing could not have been a proper hearing on the issues because the order setting the matter on May 2 did not explicitly indicate that a hearing was to take place. However, UEIC provides no authority to suggest that explicit notice of the hearing was required in light of the statutory regime governing garnishment actions, nor does it present any authority that undermines the clear language of 2-711(a). 735 ILCS 5/12-711(a) (West 2012) (“[t]he judgment creditor or the judgment debtor may contest the truth or sufficiency of the garnishee’s answer and the court shall immediately, unless for good cause the hearing is postponed, proceed to try the issues”).
The court held that the record strongly suggests that UEIC had at least constructive notice of the hearing. When presented with UEIC’s assertion that it had no knowledge the May 2, 2012 proceeding constituted a hearing to answer and contest the garnishment because the “other” box was checked on the continuance order, the trial court dismissed this characterization as “absurd.” Indeed, the bystander’s report of the proceeding indicates that the trial court reviewed and heard argument on the answer from both counsels prior to confirming the conditional judgment. Illinois law governing garnishment actions explicitly provides trial courts with the authority to proceed in such a manner. See 735 ILCS 5/12-706(a), 5/12-711(a) (West 2012). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to confirm the conditional judgment was proper and within the bounds of substantial justice.
Jones v. United Equitable Group Ltd., 2013 WL 5442426 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.). (This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).)
