Stacking Allowed when Policies at Issue are not Written to Preclude it under Certain Set of Facts
In Estate of Lovgren v. Country Preferred Insurance Company, Catherine Lovgren was driving her vehicle in which her three minor grandchildren, Leanna Martin, Cassandra Martin, and Anthony Lovgren, were passengers. Catherine’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by John Zimmerly. Catherine died and the three minor children all suffered injuries. Zimmerly’s automobile insurance denied coverage for the collision. The plaintiffs filed underinsured motorist and medical payment claims under their automobile insurance policies, which had been issued by Country Preferred Insurance Company (“Country Preferred”). There were three policies at issue, all had been issued by Country Preferred, and all contained identical underinsured motorist coverage amounts per person and per occurrence.
The court reviewed whether the three policies’ underinsured motorist coverage can be stacked, thereby providing each minor with a potential coverage limit of $500,000.
Country Preferred argued that the language in the policy prohibited stacking because public policy warranted a ruling in favor of Country Preferred.
Under this ruling, the court did not see a public policy argument that would preclude stacking. The court acknowledged that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute in Illinois is “to place insured parties injured by an uninsured driver in substantially the same position they would have been in if the driver had been insured.” The court also recognized that there is no reason to prohibit stacking in this case when the policies at issue are not written to preclude it under a certain set of facts.
Estate of Lovgren v. Country Preferred Ins. Co., 2014 IL App (3d) 120753.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
